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THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ† & LUCY CHANG†† 
ABSTRACT 
  In areas of complexity, people often rely on heuristics—by which 
we broadly mean simplifications of reality that allow people to make 
decisions in spite of their limited ability to process information. When 
this reliance becomes routine and widespread within a community, it 
can develop into a custom. As long as such a heuristic-based custom 
reasonably approximates reality, society continues to benefit. In the 
financial sector, however, rapid changes in markets and products 
have disconnected some of these customs from reality, leading to 
massive failures, and increasing financial complexity is accelerating 
the rate of change, threatening future failures. We examine this 
“custom-to-failure cycle” and consider how law can help to manage 
the cycle and to mitigate its failures. In that context, we also analyze 
whether individuals and firms who follow heuristic-based customs 
should be subject to liability if the resulting failures harm society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are “limited-capacity information processors.”1 In 
areas of complexity, we tend to compensate by relying heavily on 
heuristics—broadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us 
to make decisions in spite of our limited ability to process 
information.2 Sometimes these simplifications are based on models.3 
Other simplifications are more psychologically based.4 
 
 1. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Towards a 
Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335 (1992). 
 2. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 584 (11th ed. 2008) (defining a 
“heuristic” as a method or procedure that “serv[es] as an aid to . . . problem-solving by 
experimental and esp[ecially] trial-and-error methods”). An example of such a heuristic is the 
U.S. legal requirement that purchasers of alcohol must be at least twenty-one years of age, 
which reduces the complicated question of an individual’s ability to responsibly consume 
alcohol to the simple metric of age. In this Essay, the term “heuristic” does not refer to 
cognitive biases, such as availability and optimism bias, that are sometimes referred to as 
heuristics. For further information on such biases, see generally, for example, NASSIM 
NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007); and Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 
1367–70 (2011), which discuss the cognitive constraints associated with analyzing complex 
financial information. There is significant literature detailing these biases and offering 
suggestions to reduce the impact of such biases in consumer decisionmaking. See generally, e.g., 
MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  
 3. In operations research, for example, the term “heuristics” refers to “computationally 
simple models that allow people to ‘ . . . quickly [find] good feasible solutions.’” Konstantinos V. 
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Reliance on a heuristic can become so routine and widespread 
within a community that it develops into a custom, which we refer to 
in this Essay as a “heuristic-based custom.”5 This type of custom may 
not—and indeed, as this Essay assumes, does not6—become the basis 
for law per se. Rather, it is a custom in the sense of a “usual or 
habitual course of action, a long-established practice,”7 which is 
merely “one element of the law-creating fact called custom.”8  
When a heuristic-based custom reasonably approximates reality, 
society should benefit. Modern finance, for example, has become so 
complex that the financial community routinely relies on heuristic-
based customs, such as determining creditworthiness of securities by 
relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk on financial 
products by relying on simplified mathematical models.9 Without this 
reliance, financial markets could not operate.10 
 
Katsikopoulos, Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, Performance, and the 
Emerging Theory and Practice, 8 DECISION ANALYSIS 10, 11 (2011) (alterations in original) 
(quoting FREDERICK S. HILLIER & GERALD J. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH 624 n.1 (7th ed. 2001)). 
 4. In psychology, the term “heuristic” refers to both informal and quantitative 
psychological processes that “in general . . . are quite useful, but sometimes . . . lead to severe 
and systematic errors.” Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). For a discussion of many common 
psychologically based simplifications and errors, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, 
FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 5. We use the term “custom” in its common meaning of “a usage or practice common to 
many or to a particular place or class.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 308. 
 6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 7. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d 
ed. 1967). 
 8. See id. (arguing that the second element needed for custom to become law-creating is 
that the individuals performing the custom “must be convinced that they fulfill, by their actions 
or abstentions, a duty, or that they exercise a right”); cf. Gerald J. Postema, Custom, Normative 
Practice, and the Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 701, 717 (2012) (discussing customary rules as “rules of a 
particular community that govern, but also emerge from, the interactions of its members”).  
 9. Christopher L. Culp, Merton H. Miller & Andrea M.P. Neves, Value at Risk: Uses and 
Abuses, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1998, at 26, 27 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–3.  
 10. See James P. Crutchfield, The Hidden Fragility of Complex Systems—Consequences of 
Change, Changing Consequences, in CULTURES OF CHANGE: SOCIAL ATOMS AND ELECTRONIC 
LIVES 98, 102–03 (Gennaro Ascione et al. eds., 2009) (noting the increasing structural 
complexity and fragility of modern markets, including financial markets, as part of “the world 
we built”); see also Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. 
L. REV. 779, 799–803 (2011) (discussing the complexity of financial markets and the bounded 
rationality of financial-community members, as well as the need for heuristics to process and 
analyze financial information); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Complexity in 
Financial Markets 5–8 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://scholar.princeton.edu/markus/files/complexity.pdf (noting that because financial-
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When a heuristic-based custom no longer reflects reality, 
however, reliance on the custom can become harmful. In recent years, 
for example, financial markets and products have innovated so 
rapidly that heuristic-based customs—and thus behavior based on 
those customs—have lagged behind the changing reality. The 
resulting mismatch, in turn, has led to massive financial failures, such 
as investors relying on credit ratings that no longer are accurate11 and 
members of the financial community assessing risk using simplified 
models that have become misleading.12 
We call this cycle—(i) reliance on heuristics that reasonably 
approximate reality; (ii) the development of customs based on those 
heuristics; (iii) changes that disconnect those customs from reality; 
and (iv) failures resulting from continued reliance on those customs—
the custom-to-failure cycle. 
This Essay tests the hypothesis of the custom-to-failure cycle in 
the context of financial complexity. The focus on financial complexity 
is not intended to suggest that the custom-to-failure cycle arises only 
in that context; the cycle may well be part of the larger problem of 
human limitations in processing and acting on complex information.13 
We have not, however, systematically examined the custom-to-failure 
cycle in that larger context. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, Part I shows that reliance 
on heuristics can develop into heuristic-based customs. It then 
explains why heuristic-based customs can discourage the 
reassessment of their underlying heuristics. Thereafter, Part II shows 
that failures can result when the customs no longer reflect reality. 
Finally, Part III examines how law can help to manage the 
custom-to-failure cycle and to mitigate its failures. This examination 
 
community members have bounded rationality, they must simplify complex financial markets by 
using, for example, models and summaries); cf. TALEB, supra note 2, at 69 (observing that 
heuristics are necessary to enable action in the face of otherwise overwhelming complexity and 
randomness). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. Although different examples in this Essay refer to reliance on 
different heuristic-based customs, each particular example refers, for clarity, to only a single 
heuristic-based custom. This Essay’s analysis should be valid, however, even if an example 
involved reliance on multiple heuristic-based customs.  
 12. See infra Parts II.A & II.B. Similar failures almost certainly will continue because 
increasing financial complexity is increasing the rate of change at which financial markets and 
products are innovating. 
 13. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (discussing broader problems resulting from human irrationality 
and overreliance on heuristics). 
SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2012  2:42 PM 
2012] THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE 771 
confronts an important normative, yet real-world,  dilemma. 
Heuristic-based customs, like any other customs, can become 
internalized as social norms of appropriate behavior, hereinafter, 
“custom-derived norms.”14 The creation of such norms in private 
groups, such as the financial community, is a “standard explanation” 
for successful self-regulation.15 The dilemma is whether individuals 
and firms following heuristic-based customs that have become 
custom-derived norms—assuming the custom-derived norms have not 
themselves become law16—should be subject to criminal or civil 
liability when their behavior causes failures that harm society. This 
dilemma is at the root of the frustration as to why, after the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression, so few have been fined or 
gone to jail. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND FAILURE TO REASSESS HEURISTIC-
BASED CUSTOMS 
As reliance on a heuristic spreads throughout the financial 
community and becomes routine,17 it can develop into a heuristic-
based custom.18 Two examples of such developments are the use of 
value-at-risk (VaR) models and credit ratings. The history of these 
financial tools also shows, however, that if members of the financial 
community expect that heuristic-based customs approximate reality, 
they may fail to question the continuing accuracy of the underlying 
heuristic.19 
 
 14. A “norm” is “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and 
serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 846 (11th ed. 2008) (emphasis added).  
 15. ANNALISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 33 (2011).  
 16. This Essay assumes that the custom-derived norms in question have not themselves 
actually become law. This Essay’s concept of custom lacks the second element needed for 
custom to become-law creating. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 17. For example, a heuristic may spread due to the desire of the financial-community 
members to reduce transaction costs. 
 18. We focus on this notion of a heuristic-based custom, as opposed to custom as unwritten 
law among participants. See, e.g., RICHARD C. OSBORN, BUSINESS FINANCE: THE 
MANAGEMENT APPROACH 177–78 (1965) (discussing the use of trade credit as a common form 
of payment and noting that this “informal system is possible only because of its general 
acceptance as a customary business practice”). 
 19. This failure to question the continuing accuracy of underlying heuristics can be viewed 
as a type of complacency. Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz¸ supra note 2, at 1366–68 (examining 
complacency as a cause of financial failure).  
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A. Reliance on Heuristics Can Develop into Heuristic-Based Customs 
Since the 1990s, financial firms increasingly have relied on VaR 
models to evaluate and report market risk.20 Although many 
variations of these models exist, all summarize risk evaluation as a 
simple quantitative statistic expressed in dollar terms.21 Reliance on 
VaR has become so routine and widespread that it is now the 
financial industry’s “standard risk measure”—effectively a heuristic-
based custom based on “computationally simple models”22—for 
assessing market risk exposure.23  
Credit ratings are simplifying metrics for addressing information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.24 Rating agencies 
formalistically assess borrower creditworthiness based on models,25 
expressing their ultimate conclusion through “an ordinal ranking of a 
borrower’s, or a security’s, credit quality” relative to other borrowers 
and securities.26 Credit ratings also play a “certification” role that 
enables comparison of securities with different risk characteristics.27 
Due to the simplicity of credit ratings, investors routinely have relied 
 
 20. See Culp et al., supra note 9, at 27 (stating that VaR started receiving industry support 
in 1993). For current examples of VaR reliance, see MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY 
REPORTS FIRST QUARTER 2012, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.morgan 
stanley.com/ about/ir/shareholder/1q2012.pdf?v=1; Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q), at 75, 135, 159, available at www.goldmansachs.com/ investor-
relations/financials/ current/10q/10q-2012-1q.pdf.  
 21. See Giorgio Consigli, Tail Estimation and Mean—VaR Portfolio Selection in Markets 
Subject to Financial Instability, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1355, 1356 (2002) (noting that VaR is the 
standard risk-measurement tool but also that other model-based credit-risk measurements 
exist).  
 22. Heuristics are sometimes simplifications of reality based on computational models. See 
supra note 3. 
 23. Consigli, supra note 21; see also Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Jan. 2, 2009, at B24 (discussing how the VaR metric came into prominence because of its ability 
to assess individual and firm-wide risk and because of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s requirement that firms disclose a quantitative measure of their market risk).  
 24. PRAGYAN DEB, MARK MANNING, GARETH MURPHY, ADRIAN PENALVER & ARON 
TOTH, BANK OF ENG., WHITHER THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY? 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/fs_paper09.pdf; see also Donald MacKenzie, 
The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1778, 1785 (2011) 
(noting that the use of credit ratings enables comparison across asset classes by reference to 
spreads over benchmark rates such as LIBOR, perhaps at the danger of “black box[ing]” the 
complexities of some assets). 
 25. See supra notes 3, 22 and accompanying text. 
 26. DEB ET AL., supra note 24, at 4. 
 27. Id. at 5–6. 
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on such ratings for decades to assess borrower creditworthiness.28 This 
reliance has become widespread not only in the United States but 
also throughout the world,29 effectively forming a heuristic-based 
custom for assessing creditworthiness. 
B. Heuristic-Based Customs Can Discourage Reassessment of Their 
Underlying Heuristics 
As previously observed,30 routine and widespread reliance on 
VaR models has developed into a heuristic-based custom. Financial 
firms now rely on VaR models not only to evaluate market risk but 
also to generate bases for compensating their employees and 
managers, such as adopting compensation systems that reward profit 
generation with “low risks” as indicated by VaR statistics.31 Until 
recently, however, neither firms using VaR models nor employees 
and managers being compensated based on such models have 
questioned the models’ underlying heuristics.32 Moreover, senior 
managers of financial firms, who often lack the technical expertise to 
themselves question the models, have not attempted to resolve the 
conflicts of interest that make reliance on the models even more 
questionable.33 
Similarly, the heuristic-based custom of relying on credit ratings 
had become so entrenched that, at least until the global financial 
crisis, financial firms rarely questioned the accuracy of these ratings. 
Faith in the accuracy of credit ratings was reinforced by their long 
record of reliability for assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers 
under relatively simple debt instruments, such as corporate bonds34 
and basic securitization instruments.35 
 
 28. See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 3 (“Investors in domestic and cross-border financial 
transactions increasingly rely on rating agencies for substantial comfort regarding the risks 
associated with the full and timely payment of debt securities.”).  
 29. Id.; see also PIERO CINQUEGRANA, THE REFORM OF THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (2009) (noting the widespread use of credit ratings).  
 30. See supra Part II.A. 
 31. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460 (2009) (citing Nocera, supra note 23, at 
24, 26, 46). 
 32. See id. at 463 (“[M]anagers will probably have little expertise to go beyond VaR or 
other mathematically modeled risk profiles.”).  
 33. Id.; see also infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 34. See, e.g., SEC Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies November 21, 2002 (2002) (prepared 
statement of the Bond Market Association), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/extra/credrate/bondmarket.htm (“Credit rating agencies play a critically important 
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Members of the financial community continued their 
unquestioning belief in the accuracy of credit ratings even when 
ratings were applied to new debt instruments, such as collateralized-
debt obligations that were themselves backed by asset-backed 
securities (ABS CDO securities).36 ABS CDO securities were much 
more complex and highly leveraged than corporate bonds and basic 
securitization instruments,37 requiring the use of sophisticated 
Gaussian copula analysis to analyze complex default correlations.38 
 
role . . . by providing an independent source of information on the credit standing of corporate 
and other issuers of debt securities. . . . [T]he current system functions reasonably well . . . .”); 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., CORPORATE DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1920–2010, at 9 
(2011), available at http://www.moodys.com/ researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx? 
docid=PBC_131388 (“Moody’s ratings have historically proven to be effective predictors of 
default.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO RATINGS PERFORMANCE 13 (2011), available at 
http://img.en25.com/Web/ StandardandPoors/ SP_GuideToRatingsPerformance.pdf (“Higher 
credit ratings have typically correlated with lower default rates . . . .”); Rating the Ratings, 
WORLD FIN. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.worldfinance.com/columnists/rating-the-ratings (noting 
the “strong historic track record” of “global corporate ratings”). 
 35. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784 (discussing the rating agencies’ decision to rely 
primarily on existing ratings approaches to evaluate new asset-backed securities (ABS)). 
 36. Id. at 1784–86. 
 37. Rating agencies acknowledged a few differences between the rating methodology for 
structured-finance securities compared to that of corporate securities but noted that the rating 
process was similar for both. STANDARD & POOR’S, PRINCIPLES-BASED RATING 
METHODOLOGY FOR GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE SECURITIES 5 (2007), 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=12
45324618770 (explaining that Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings are the same for corporate 
bonds and securitized-debt issues but noting differences in how the markets price the two 
instruments); Letter from Frédéric Drevon, Senior Managing Dir. & Head of Eur., Moody’s 
Investors Serv. Ltd., to Fabrice Demarigny, Sec’y Gen., Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 2 (July 
31, 2007), available at http://www.moodys.com/ researchdocumentcontentpage. 
aspx?docid=PBC_104185 (“The rating process in [Moody’s Investors Service’s] structured and 
corporate rating groups are similar.”).  
 38. In the decade preceding the global financial crisis, bond investors and banks adopted a 
specific statistical technique, the Gaussian copula, to evaluate the default correlation. Felix 
Salmon, A Formula for Disaster, WIRED, Mar. 2009, at 74, 76–77; see also Kathryn Judge, 
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 657, 677–78 (2012) (discussing the origin of the Gaussian copula and its use in the 
market); MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1804 (“All three main agencies largely switched to 
evaluating CDOs using Gaussian-copula software systems . . . .”). Although this technique had 
previously been used by actuaries to consider the impact of events on human lifespan with some 
success, it had not been applied to credit-risk analysis and evaluation of ABS prior to this 
period. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1804 (noting that S&P began using Gaussian-copula 
software in November 2001 and was the first of the main agencies to employ the tool); Sam 
Jones, Of Couples and Copulas, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at MAG1 (noting the use of actuarial 
sciences to determine the probability of a widower’s death). Essentially, a Gaussian-copula 
approach enabled a single estimate of default correlation by combining probabilities of default 
of the underlying assets in a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) portfolio based on numerous 
assumptions—in other words, a heuristic. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1803 n.33. Even the 
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This risk-analysis methodology represented a marked change from 
the traditional ratings methodologies that had proven to be reliable 
over many decades.39 Nonetheless, members of the financial 
community, including investors, simply assumed the continued 
reliability of the credit ratings on the new instruments.40 
 
three major rating agencies—Moody’s Investors Service, S&P, and Fitch Ratings—adopted 
some form of Gaussian-copula default correlation assessment for CDO portfolios. Id. at 1804. 
The extent to which members of the financial community understood the underlying 
assumptions and limitations of the Gaussian-copula approach is unclear. See Judge, supra note 
38, at 723 (noting that the Gaussian copula provided “market participants and regulators [with] 
a plausible basis for believing that the complexity arising from fragmentation nodes could be 
managed even without being understood directly”). This discussion is not to say that rating 
agencies solely relied on models in their creditworthiness evaluations of securities. See, e.g., Wall 
Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 48 (2010) (statement of Yuri Yoshizawa, Group Managing Director, 
Structured Finance, Moody’s Investors Service) (“One common misperception is that [Moody’s] 
credit ratings are derived solely from the application of a mathematical process or model. This is 
not the case.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 7 (2011), 
available at http://img.en25.com/Web/ StandardandPoors/ SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf 
(describing ratings methodologies); STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 37, at 4 (“[W]e use a 
general framework and established guidelines, as well as various quantitative techniques and 
models, to enhance the rating committee’s qualitative opinions.”). 
 39. Cf. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784–85 (noting that the market for ABS CDO 
securities would have been limited if market participation required understanding the Gaussian-
copula models). Compare, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING METHODOLOGY: 
GLOBAL PACKAGED GOODS INDUSTRY 2 (2009), available at http://www.moodys.com/ 
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_119226 (stating the five key factors used to 
determine risk: (1) “Scale and Diversification,” (2) “Franchise Strength and Growth Potential,” 
(3) “Distribution and Pricing Power,” (4) “Cost Efficiency and Profitability,” and (5) “Financial 
Strategy and Credit Metrics”), with MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., THE BINOMIAL EXPANSION 
METHOD APPLIED TO CBO/CLO ANALYSIS 1–4 (1996), available at http://www.moodys.com/ 
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF5066 (describing the binomial expansion 
method and providing an example of the calculations), and MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., 
RATING METHODOLOGY: MOODY’S APPROACH TO RATING SF CDOS 1–8 (2012), 
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF157850 (using flow 
charts and several equations to describe how Moody’s rates the credit risk of CDOs backed by 
structured-finance assets). 
 40. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1785 (“Ratings ‘black boxed’ these complexities.”). 
Rating agencies acknowledged that “[b]onds with the same credit rating, therefore, may be 
comparable with respect to overall credit quality,” even if specific characteristics were not the 
same. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING METHODOLOGY: THE EVOLVING MEANING OF 
MOODY’S BOND RATINGS 3 (1999), available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocument 
contentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM48185; see also About Credit Ratings, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings (follow “Comparable Across 
Different Sectors and Regions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (“Standard & Poor’s uses 
the same rating scale across the structured finance, corporate, and government sectors. This 
rating scale is designed to provide a common language for comparing creditworthiness, 
regardless of the type of entity or assets underlying the debt instrument or the structure of the 
financial obligation.”). 
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II.  FAILURES CAN RESULT WHEN HEURISTIC-BASED CUSTOMS NO 
LONGER REFLECT REALITY 
The usefulness of a heuristic depends, of course, on its 
approximation of reality. In relatively stable times, when there are 
considerable historical data or personal experiences upon which to 
draw, heuristics—and thus heuristic-based customs—can closely 
approximate reality. This Essay focuses, however, on the financial 
industry, which is marked by constant change. Under these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that a given heuristic will provide a close 
approximation of reality for long. Periodic reevaluation of heuristic-
based customs is therefore critical.  
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part II, the financial community 
does not always engage in that reevaluation. The result can be failure. 
This Part highlights the perils of failing to reevaluate heuristic-based 
customs through the examples discussed in Part II—reliance on VaR 
models, and reliance on credit ratings—as well as through the 
additional illustrations of reliance on collateral and incremental 
innovation. 
A. Failure Resulting from Reliance on VaR Models 
In the decade preceding the global financial crisis, financial-
community members placed “‘enormous faith in the market’s ability 
to analyze and measure risk’ through mathematical models,” such as 
VaR.41 When markets changed to embed credit-default swaps—a new 
form of derivatives product—in many financial transactions, financial-
community members continued to use VaR models to assess the risk 
of those products.42 
Unfortunately, VaR modeling of credit-default swaps was 
statistically distorted. Although these swaps “generate small gains but 
only rarely have losses,”43 VaR models did not take into account that 
credit-default swaps are likely to generate outsized losses if and when 
such losses occur.44 Although some midlevel managers of firms may 
have understood this distortion, conflicts of interest may have 
 
 41. Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 462 (quoting Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating 
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 211 (2009)). 
 42. Nocera, supra note 23, at 43. 
 43. Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 460.  
 44. See id. (“[A]ny losses that might eventually occur would be huge.”). 
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dissuaded them from informing senior management.45 As a result, 
many firms that were counterparties on credit-default swaps, or that 
invested in transactions with embedded credit-default swaps, lost 
huge amounts of money.46 For example, the government made 
available to the American International Group (AIG) up to $182.3 
billion of assistance from taxpayer funds in order to avoid insolvency 
and potential systemic consequences as a result of AIG’s losses on 
credit-default swaps.47 
B. Failure Resulting from Reliance on Credit Ratings 
The global financial crisis also highlighted the potential for 
failure resulting from reliance on credit ratings. As discussed in this 
Part, members of the financial community continued to believe in the 
accuracy of credit ratings even when ratings were applied to complex, 
new, highly leveraged ABS CDO securities.48 Investor reliance on 
credit ratings was further reinforced by financial regulators, who 
sometimes incorporated credit ratings into their oversight 
frameworks49 and set minimum-rating requirements on investments 
by financial institutions.50 
 
 45. See id. (explaining that midlevel, or secondary, managers of firms are normally paid on 
a short-term basis, creating conflicts with the long-term interests of the firm). 
 46. See, e.g., John Grgurich, Credit Default Swaps: Still Here, Still Able To Wreak Havoc, 
DAILYFINANCE (May 11, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/05/11/jpmorgan-
credit-default-swaps-still-wreaking-havoc (“Credit default swaps were at the heart of the 
financial crisis.”).  
 47. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-574, TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM: GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO AIG LESSENS AS EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
ARE SOLD 15 n.62 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590677.pdf; see also id. at 
17–18 (“Based on the composition of the remaining federal assistance to AIG, the repayment 
and recovery progress thus far on all assistance as of March 22, 2012, and the March 30, 2012, 
value of the remaining shares of AIG stock held by Treasury, the government could receive 
total returns of approximately $15.1 billion in excess of the assistance provided . . . .”). For the 
purposes of our analysis, the report’s suggestion that taxpayers may ultimately profit from the 
bailout is irrelevant. The government did not choose to invest in AIG as a sound investment, 
but rather was forced to do so to prevent the collapse of AIG. For a brief discussion of the 
motivations behind and effects of these collateral calls, see RILES, supra note 15, at 3–4.  
 48. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 49. FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA RATINGS 1 
(2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf. 
 50. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784. Professor Donald MacKenzie notes that financial 
statutes and regulations may encode ratings preferences as well, id., but this is not the focus of 
this Essay. 
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Failure resulted when the rating methodologies utilized for ABS 
CDO and similar securities produced inaccurate ratings.51 The 
resulting unexpected defaults on what were thought to be investment-
grade securities triggered a loss of confidence in the accuracy of all 
credit ratings, which in turn contributed to the financial crisis.52 
There are many other possible examples, two of which follow in 
Sections C and D, of failures resulting from reliance on heuristic-
based customs that no longer reflect reality.53 
C. Failure Resulting from Reliance on Collateral 
Lenders’ reliance on collateral is a rational response to the 
asymmetric information and uncertainty inherent in making a loan.54 
The asymmetry and uncertainty that occur are due in part to the fact 
that assessing a borrower’s ability to repay debt can be complex and 
difficult because it depends not only on individual borrower 
characteristics but also on macroeconomic factors, such as the 
occurrence of a recession.55 Banks and other lenders therefore often 
 
 51. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 462 (“[M]any mortgage-backed securities turned out to 
be incorrectly rated.”). 
 52. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 211, 225 (2009) (discussing financial markets’ susceptibility to contagion and how losses in 
securities with “investment-grade” ratings caused investors to panic). 
 53. Social scientists have also observed these types of failures. Sociologist Patricia 
Thornton, for example, has observed such a failure in the higher-education publishing industry 
when that industry shifted from an emphasis on building author-editor relationships as a source 
of long-term organic growth to adoption of the consolidated conglomerate model’s focus on 
acquisitions to drive profitability and growth. PATRICIA H. THORNTON, MARKETS FROM 
CULTURE: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION PUBLISHING 26–36 (2004). In the 1970s, higher-education publishers faced 
increased resource competition and began to acquire firms and create conglomerates to achieve 
economies of scale and scope to improve yearly profitability and growth. Id. at 27–28. 
Eventually, reliance on making acquisitions to enhance profitability and growth became so 
routine and widespread that it effectively developed into what we characterize as a heuristic-
based custom. Publishing managers, whose success was now measured by yearly growth figures, 
widely pursued acquisitions. Id. at 31, 34. But as the industry consolidated, the making of further 
acquisitions stopped being efficient. Firm managers nonetheless continued to pursue 
acquisitions, without independent cost-benefit evaluations, simply because others in the industry 
were doing so. Id. Acquisitions involving higher-education publishers occurred “in 
waves . . . that could not be explained by efficiency outcomes,” and many publishing 
conglomerates failed. Id. at 6. We do not suggest that all of the failed acquisitions were caused 
by reliance on the heuristic-based custom of pursuing acquisitions; the failure to reevaluate the 
strategy of pursuing acquisitions as a simplified mode to greater profitability, however, at least 
contributed to these failures.  
 54. See Yaron Leitner, Using Collateral To Secure Loans, BUS. REV., Second Quarter 2006, 
at 9, 9 (discussing the common use of collateral to secure loans).  
 55. STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 38, at 11–12. 
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rely on overcollateralization—requiring collateral with value that 
exceeds the amount of the loan—as a simplified means to assess the 
creditworthiness of their loans.56 Because assessing collateral value is 
usually much easier than assessing a borrower’s ability to repay, 
reliance on overcollateralization has become routine and widespread, 
effectively developing into a heuristic-derived custom.57 
Overcollateralization can in fact provide sufficient protection 
against borrower default and thus can be a reasonable proxy for 
creditworthiness. Should the borrower default, the collateral can be 
sold to repay the debt.58 In periods of rapid change, however, reliance 
on overcollateralization can sometimes fail. 
For example, in the years preceding the Great Depression, banks 
lending “on margin”—a practice whereby borrowers use proceeds of 
a loan to purchase shares of stock and then pledge that stock as 
collateral to the banks—assumed they were adequately protected, 
even for margin loans made to risky borrowers.59 Although these 
loans were not initially overcollateralized—because the value of the 
pledged stock initially equaled, but did not exceed, the amount of the 
loan—banks expected the stock market to continue rising, as it had 
for decades. An increase in stock prices, and thus a consequent 
increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause the loans to 
become overcollateralized.60 In October 1929, however, the collapse 
in stock prices caused massive failure as many of those risky 
borrowers defaulted on the now-undercollateralized margin loans.61 
Similarly, prior to the global financial crisis, banks and private 
mortgage lenders made loans to risky, or “subprime,” borrowers who 
used the loan proceeds to purchase homes and then mortgaged their 
homes as collateral to the lenders. The lenders assumed they were 
 
 56. Heuristics include simplifications of reality based on models and psychological 
processes. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. Reliance on overcollateralization is a 
heuristic that overlaps these categories. 
 57. See generally Securities Lending: Managing Value Generation and Risk, J.P. MORGAN, 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Securities_Lending_Managing_Value_Generation_and_
Risk/1256338170739 (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing the use of collateral in securities 
lending). For a discussion of the role of collateral prior to the Great Depression and leading up 
to the “recent global financial crisis,” see Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1356–57, 1359–
60.  
 58. Financial-community members have similarly used collateral as a creditworthiness-
assessment tool in derivatives trading. RILES, supra note 15, at 35–36.  
 59. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1356. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1357. 
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adequately protected.62 Although these mortgage loans were not 
initially overcollateralized—because the value of a mortgaged home 
initially equaled, but did not exceed, the amount of the loan—the 
lenders expected housing prices to continue rising, as had been the 
case for decades.63 An increase in housing prices, and thus a 
consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause 
the loans to become overcollateralized.64 In the fall of 2007, however, 
the collapse in housing prices caused massive failure as many 
subprime borrowers defaulted on the now-undercollateralized 
mortgage loans.65 
D. Failure Resulting from Incremental Innovation 
Heuristic-based customs can build incrementally, with small 
financial innovations building on past heuristic-based customs with 
which financial-community members have become comfortable.66 
 
 62. Id. at 1359–60.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller 100 Year Chart (2011 Update), BIG PICTURE (Apr. 13, 
2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-update. 
 65. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling, 
some of these asset-backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial institutions heavily 
invested in these securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to appear, if not 
be, financially risky.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. A somewhat analogous example of this process is the judicial misapplication of 
substantive-consolidation law. Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy in bankruptcy 
whereby a bankruptcy judge can decide, in certain circumstances, to order the consolidation of 
two, or more, otherwise legally separate companies. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. 
MARKELL & LISSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL 
MARKETS 85 (2004) All courts agree that substantive consolidation requires, as a minimum, 
significant breaches of corporate formalities between the companies being considered for 
consolidation. See id. When such breaches occur, however, courts frequently state that 
substantive consolidation should be permitted only if its benefits substantially outweigh any 
harm. Id. at 86. The substantially outweigh test serves as a simplifying analytical framework—a 
sort of judicial heuristic. In the trivial scenario wherein the failure to substantively consolidate 
companies would harm all creditors, including creditors otherwise opposing substantive 
consolidation, all courts will come to the same conclusion. For all other scenarios, however, 
courts purporting to apply this substantially outweigh test fail to do so in a systematic way. One 
of us has testified that the confusion stems from the fact that substantive consolidation is 
actually a zero-sum game: it simply rearranges how assets are distributed to creditors without 
increasing the aggregate distributions. Transcript of Proceedings at 13–29, In re Petters Co., 401 
B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (No. 08-45257). Accordingly, a substantially outweigh test is 
mathematically nonsensical in this context. We believe that courts have not recognized this 
problem for two reasons: (1) the application of substantive consolidation is inherently complex, 
especially for judges who—as is unfortunately true for lawyers generally—rarely have deep 
mathematical aptitude; and (2) frequent judicial repetition of the contours of the substantially 
outweigh test renders that a heuristic-based custom, which impairs critical inquiry into the test.  
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Professor Kathryn Judge notes just such an effect within the 
mortgage-securitization industry in the decades preceding the global 
financial crisis, by which incremental innovation resulted in incredibly 
complex and unwieldy fragmentation of cash flows.67 
After banks and investors became comfortable with basic 
mortgage-backed securities, they gradually became comfortable with 
the addition of incremental structural innovations, riskier assets, or 
both—without reconsidering that these innovations and assets 
created new securities with new risks.68 As a result, these financial 
institutions widely and routinely relied on assessment techniques 
(heuristics) previously applied to simpler securities without properly 
considering the possibility that each new innovation or asset could 
render the heuristic less accurate. In fact, certain innovations and 
assets reduced the heuristic’s accuracy in novel ways. For example, 
although cash flows had been fragmented in the past, innovative new 
fragmentations of cash flows misaligned investor interests.69 Investors, 
however, failed to recognize the misalignment.70 Furthermore, 
increases in the number of intermediaries between the originators of 
mortgage loans and investors in the securities backed by those 
mortgage loans caused an unanticipated loss of important information 
about the loans.71 In addition, although investors “accustomed to 
investing in private-label [mortgage-backed securities] . . . may have 
questioned the additional risks posed by the inclusion of risky 
mortgages in a subprime [mortgage-backed security],” those investors 
 
 67. Judge, supra note 38, at 670–77. 
 68. See id. at 687 (“The incremental nature of the processes through which financial 
innovations become highly complex is critical to understanding . . . why that complexity itself 
may not be subjected to close scrutiny by market participants or regulators.”). This increasing 
comfort with incremental structural innovations is also consistent with Professor MacKenzie’s 
hypothesis of path dependence, in which market participants respond to change through the 
modification of existing evaluation practices, rather than the creation of new evaluation 
practices. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1783. 
 69. Judge, supra note 38, at 682–83. For instance, investors in the AAA-rated tranche of a 
CDO would prefer the highest-quality portfolio of assets possible, even at lower yield, whereas 
investors in the unrated equity tranche of a CDO would prefer a lower-quality but higher-
yielding portfolio of assets to maximize their return. Note that investor interests may change 
over time according to asset performance. 
 70. See id. at 687 (observing that an investor accustomed to cash-flow fragmentations 
would not “be likely to scrutinize a gradual increase in the number or diversity of tranches 
issued in MBS transactions”). 
 71. See id. at 686 (observing that an “investor accustomed to investing in pass-
throughs . . . presented with a private-label MBS, for example, may not have questioned 
whether using a servicer could affect the cash flows coming from a mortgage, because the use of 
such agents was an innovation to which that investor had already become accustomed”). 
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“might not revisit the question of whether purchase agreements could 
be relied upon to ensure mortgage originators had engaged in 
appropriate due diligence in determining whether to extend a loan 
packaged into an [mortgage-backed security].”72 This growing 
complexity and fragmentation played a significant role in the global 
financial crisis.73 
*** 
The discussion thus far has shown that reliance on heuristics can 
develop into heuristic-based customs, that heuristic-based customs 
can discourage the reassessment of their underlying heuristics, and 
that failures can result when the customs no longer reflect reality. We 
next examine how law can help to manage the custom-to-failure cycle 
and mitigate those failures. 
III.  HOW LAW CAN HELP 
To understand how law can help to manage the custom-to-failure 
cycle and mitigate its failures, consider how law could address each 
step in that cycle.74 Law could be used to try (i) to prevent reliance on 
heuristics in the first place, (ii) to block the development of heuristic-
based customs, (iii) to make it less likely that parties will follow 
heuristic-based customs that have become disconnected from reality, 
which we refer to as “outdated heuristic-based customs,” or (iv) to 
address failures that result when parties follow heuristic-based 
customs that no longer reflect reality. 
It is unlikely that law could effectively address the first two 
approaches. As to the first approach, even if law could prevent 
reliance on heuristics, it would generally be unwise to do so in the 
case of financial markets.75 At least in complex matters, human beings 
lack the cognitive ability to make decisions without some reliance on 
heuristics.76 As to the second approach, we do not see how law could 
 
 72. Id. at 686–87.  
 73. Id. at 687. 
 74. Recall that the custom-to-failure cycle is described as follows: (i) reliance on heuristics 
that reasonably approximate reality, (ii) development of customs based on those heuristics, (iii) 
changes that disconnect those customs from reality, and (iv) failures resulting from continued 
reliance on those customs. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 75. As a positive matter, law has accomplished this outdated heuristic prevention in certain 
narrow areas, such as employment discrimination. Employers may not refuse to hire or 
discriminate against an individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 76. See supra Part I. 
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effectively block the development of heuristic-based customs, the 
development of customs being so integrally a part of human nature. 
Our analysis therefore focuses on the latter two approaches. 
First, we examine how law could decrease the likelihood that parties 
would follow outdated heuristic-based customs. Thereafter we 
examine how law could address failures that result when parties 
follow outdated heuristic-based customs. 
A. Making It Less Likely That Parties Will Follow Outdated 
Heuristic-Based Customs 
We see at least four possible ways that law could be used, in the 
context of financial complexity, to make it less likely that parties will 
follow outdated heuristic-based customs: (1) require financial firms to 
engage in more self-aware operational risk management and 
reporting, (2) limit complex financial products, (3) criminalize the 
following of outdated heuristic-based customs, and (4) impose ex post 
liability in an effort to internalize harm. We discuss the first three 
approaches in this Part. Because the fourth approach also implicates 
the ex post addressing of failures, we discuss it as part of  Section B.77 
1. Requiring More Self-Aware Operational Risk Management and 
Reporting.  The goal of requiring more self-aware operational risk 
management and reporting would be to motivate firms to reevaluate 
their heuristic-based customs periodically. By analogy, the Basel III 
capital-adequacy guidelines require banks to engage in periodic 
financial “stress” scenarios,78 in order to motivate them to consider 
the possibility of, and to better prepare for, future periods when 
previously adequate liquidity and capital resources might prove 
inadequate.79 Similarly, section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 
 77. In this Essay, we focus on options that make parties less likely to follow outdated 
heuristic-based customs, rather than on possible solutions to the underlying problems of 
financial-community members. Our Essay does not, for example, address financial regulation 
that could resolve core market failures such as minimizing complexity in the financial system, 
mitigating intrafirm conflicts, or internalizing systemic risk consequences. For an example of 
such broader analysis, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address at the European Central Bank 
Seminar: A Regulatory Framework for Managing Systemic Risk (Oct. 20, 2011) (transcript 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945742).  
 78. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 8–9 (2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.  
 79. CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 217 (2012); cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1389 (arguing that 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)80 requires 
banks and other systemically important financial institutions to plan 
for the possibility of their liquidation.81 A central goal of this “living 
will” requirement is self-awareness, to motivate those institutions to 
consider and better prepare for a time when changing circumstances 
might cause their demise—no matter how unlikely that demise may 
seem at the time the living will is being prepared.82 
Applying this requirement to the earlier discussion of outdated 
heuristic-based customs, requiring periodic self-awareness and 
reporting could have made financial-community members more 
aware of the limitations of, and thus the potential for failure inherent 
in, VaR models, thereby avoiding their reliance on outdated VaR 
models.83 It also could have made financial-community members 
more aware of the limitations of credit ratings and the potential for 
failure when old ratings methodologies are applied to complex new 
financial products.84 Furthermore, such a requirement for self-
awareness and reporting could have made financial-community 
members more aware that loans that are not initially 
overcollateralized are inherently risky, given that a decline (or even a 
plateau) in collateral prices can prevent those loans from ever 
becoming overcollateralized.85 In each case, the requirement could 
have prevented reliance on those outdated heuristic-based customs, 
thereby preventing the failures caused by that reliance.86 
 
the simple reminder that negative economic shocks have occurred in the past will itself 
encourage more critical reflection and accurate risk assessments). Ironically, reliance on stress 
tests might itself create a heuristic-based custom in which the financial community fails to 
engage in ongoing reevaluation of the assumptions of the stress tests. Some of those 
assumptions, however, might change over time.  
 80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 81. Id. § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426–27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (Supp. IV 2011)).  
 82. See, e.g., Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012) (transcript 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spmay1012.html) (commenting 
that required resolution planning “will improve [financial firms’] efficiencies, risk management 
and contingency planning”). 
 83. See supra Part II.A. A requirement of this sort could even be coupled with a safe 
harbor from liability for firms that perform frequent, ongoing operational risk assessments. 
 84. See supra Part II.B.  
 85. See supra Part II.C.  
 86. As a practical matter, financial-community members may choose to rely on in-house 
risk managers to conduct the required reevaluation of heuristic-based customs. See, e.g., SENIOR 
SUPERVISORS GRP., FIN. STABILITY BD., RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS OF 2008, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
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2. Limiting Complex Financial Products.  The second way that 
law could make parties less likely to follow outdated heuristic-based 
customs would be to limit complex financial products. As complexity 
increases, financial-community members need to rely more heavily on 
heuristic-based customs; yet the more complex something is, the less 
likely it is, other things being equal, that the heuristic will accurately 
reflect reality.87 Limiting complex financial products would not only 
reduce the need to rely on heuristics but also would make it more 
likely that the relied-upon heuristics will more accurately reflect 
reality. 
Absent agreement on what constitutes complexity, it would be 
difficult to limit complex financial products per se.88 Complexity could 
 
publications/r_0910a.pdf (“A key weakness in governance stemmed from what several senior 
managers admitted was a disparity between the risks their firms took and those their boards of 
directors perceived the firms to be taking. . . . Within firms, the stature and influence of revenue 
producers clearly exceeded those of risk management and control functions.”); Brian W. Nocco 
& René M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
8, 8 (2006) (“[A]t a large and growing number of companies, the risk management function is 
directed by a senior executive with the title of chief risk officer (CRO) and overseen by a board 
of directors charged with monitoring risk measurements and setting limits for these measures.”); 
René M. Stulz, 6 Ways Companies Mismanage Risk, 87 HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2009, at 86, 92–
93 (“If a firm has state-of-the-art risk-management systems but the board and the CEO don’t 
understand them because the (technically very savvy) risk manager cannot properly explain the 
complex reports to nonexperts, the systems may do more harm than good by inspiring 
unwarranted confidence in their capabilities. Even worse, information may reach top 
management too late or be distorted by intermediaries.”). Effective risk managers function 
independently of profit centers and have the requisite knowledge and experience to question 
properly the underlying methodologies and heuristics of financial products. Therefore, these 
individuals may be ideally situated to reevaluate the continued accuracy of heuristic-based 
customs. For financial-community members to benefit from this required reevaluation, 
however, risk managers must have the ability to notify and request prompt action of top 
management with respect to outdated heuristic-based custom. Granting risk managers the 
authority to override the decisions of business managers upon a determination that the 
underlying heuristic is outdated would prevent timely continued reliance. Monitoring incentives 
may also encourage periodic reevaluation if structured to reward past superior risk practices 
with actual observed losses. Such an incentive would have likely increased attention to future 
long-term losses not properly captured in VaR models, the different credit-rating methodology 
(and increased unreliability) for structured financial products, and the risk inherent in relying on 
rising collateral prices to achieve overcollateralization. 
 87. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1370. 
 88. A possible approach to limiting new complex financial products might be to require an 
approval process for such products, similar to that used by the Food and Drug Administration 
for approving new medications. Compare Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for 
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st-Century Financial 
Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010606 (“We propose that when firms 
invent new financial products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval from a 
government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens pharmaceutical 
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be limited, however, by requiring that financial products become 
more standardized, thereby making such products more 
understandable.89 It is unclear, though, whether the net effect of 
requiring standardization would be socially beneficial. Although 
standardization would certainly reduce the need to rely on heuristics, 
it would limit the ability of the market to achieve efficiencies by 
issuing securities tailored to the particular needs of investors, and it 
could also make financial markets less competitive than 
unstandardized markets.90 Also, perversely, standardization could 
reinforce complacency with heuristic-derived customs, creating a 
greater risk of failure if changing circumstances cause those customs 
to become outdated. Standardization would moreover be likely to 
face opposition by financial-community members because 
commoditizing financial products would reduce profitability.91 It 
therefore is unclear whether, on a cost-benefit basis, trying to limit 
complex financial products makes sense. 
 
innovations. The agency would approve financial products if they satisfy a test for social utility 
that focuses on whether the product will likely be used more often for insurance than for 
gambling.”), with Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of New Complex 
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 52), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996755 (proposing a similar regulatory scheme for complex financial 
products, but one that uses an “economic purpose” test requiring the financial institution “to 
make an affirmative showing that the proposed complex financial instrument has a bona fide 
economic purpose that promotes productive enterprise and does not merely provide another 
means of financial speculation or regulatory arbitrage”). Even if this approach otherwise 
reduces the introduction of dangerous new financial products, however, it would not directly 
address our Essay’s problem: reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs even for financial 
products that are not inherently dangerous.  
 89. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1390 (discussing, among other things, the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that certain derivatives products be effectively standardized). 
 90. Compare Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 241 (arguing that regulatory attempts to limit 
uncertainty by standardizing transactions and financial products would likely have unintended 
negative consequences), with Judge, supra note 38, at 715 n.184 (arguing that standardization 
could reduce the informational burden on investors, facilitate coordination in the face of 
changed circumstances, and make comparing securities issued in different transactions easier for 
investors), and NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE 
IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 193–94 (2010) (listing potential benefits of increased 
standardization of ABS, including facilitating comparison and accurate pricing of these 
securities and “creat[ing] more liquid and transparent markets for [them],” but noting that “a 
few caveats also come to mind”). 
 91. See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason, Regulating for Financial System Development, Financial 
Institutions Stability, and Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE 
WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 225 (Alfredo Gigliobianco & 
Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) (arguing that banks may oppose greater standardization because 
standardization tends to reduce profit margins). 
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3. Criminalizing the Following of Outdated Heuristic-Based 
Customs. The third way that law could make it less likely that parties 
will follow outdated heuristic-based customs would be to criminalize 
the practice. We believe, however, that criminalization would be 
inappropriate. Criminal liability, which in the United States is largely 
imposed by state and federal statutes,92 generally requires mens rea, 
or a “general notion of moral blameworthiness,” on the part of the 
actor.93 Many states have adopted a more specific, elemental mens rea 
component whereby criminal liability attaches only if an actor has a 
specific state of mind for the crime.94 Because one who follows a 
heuristic-based custom may not know, or have any way of knowing, 
that a particular custom is outdated, it may be difficult to show, much 
less prove, mens rea. 
Moreover, criminalizing the following of outdated heuristic-
based customs would not appear to be justified by any of the 
traditional reasons for imposing criminal liability, of which the most 
relevant would be deterrence and retribution.95 The deterrent value is 
likely to be minimal because, as indicated, it is difficult for one 
following a heuristic-based custom to know if that custom is 
outdated.96 On the other hand, criminalization might have a chilling 
effect on the use of appropriate heuristics.97 In other contexts, it has 
been shown that criminal liability can sometimes “over-deter[] 
 
 92. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (5th ed. 2009).  
 93. Id. at 118; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (stating that 
criminal liability requires “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand”). 
 94. Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory 
Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399, 411–12 (2000); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 
(West 2008) (defining “battery” as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the 
person of another”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012) (defining 
“aggravated battery” as “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] great bodily harm, or permanent 
disability or disfigurement”). But see Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Offenses: As 
Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, at A1 (“In 
recent decades, Congress has repeatedly crafted laws that weaken or disregard the notion of 
criminal intent.”). Elemental states of mind can be used not only to impose liability, but also to 
impose varying degrees of liability. Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2009) 
(requiring “intent to cause the death of another person” for one to be guilty of murder in the 
second degree), with id. § 125.15 (requiring the “reckless[] caus[ation of] the death of another 
person” for one to be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree).  
 95. See DRESSLER, supra note 92, at 15–18 (identifying these justifications as deterrence, 
retribution, denunciation, and rehabilitation). 
 96. Indeed, people might not always realize that they are relying on a heuristic-based 
custom in the first place. 
 97. Financial markets could not operate without reliance on heuristics. See supra note 10 
and accompanying text. 
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otherwise desirable business activities” because parties may avoid 
beneficial but “marginally lawful” acts due to the uncertainty of 
criminal conviction, thereby increasing social costs and generating 
inefficiency.98 
Retribution, or revenge, does not appear to justify imposing 
criminal liability on parties following outdated heuristic-based 
customs if the parties did not know the customs were outdated and 
that following them would cause harm.99 Nonetheless, when 
significant harm results, the media often reacts by trying to identify 
wrongdoers who should be sent to jail. Retribution has been posited, 
for example, as one reason for Enron executives Kenneth Lay and 
Jeffrey Skilling’s criminal prosecutions.100 Recent frustration with the 
Obama administration for not seeking indictments in the wake of the 
global financial crisis and subsequent banking failures suggests 
continued strong impulses for retribution.101 Conceptually, though, 
significant harm in and of itself should not justify criminalizing actions 
that lack mens rea.102 
 
 98. Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without 
Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 461 & n.10 (2010) (quoting Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An 
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14). 
We later examine whether civil liability could provide appropriate deterrence. See infra Part 
III.B. 
 99. See DRESSLER, supra note 92, at 16 (observing that retributivism justifies punishment 
only when a wrongdoer violates a societal custom). Another version of retribution seeks to 
signal to the victim that society values his rights more than those of the wrongdoer. Id. at 18. 
The fairness of punishment under this theory is that, by choosing to commit the act in question, 
the wrongdoer “elevate[d] himself with respect to others.” Id. This justification does not apply 
to failures resulting from the custom-to-failure cycle, however, because the actor did not choose 
to do wrong and, in fact, he was even unaware that his actions were wrong. To the extent that 
advocates of criminal liability seek restitution for victims through the imposition of criminal 
fines, this objective can be just as easily accomplished through civil liability, without the social 
harms associated with excessive criminalization discussed in this Section. 
 100. Gopalan, supra note 98, at 459–60. 
 101. See, e.g., The Diane Rehm Show: Risky Bank Investments and the U.S. Economy 
(WAMU 88.5 radio broadcast May 14, 2012), available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/ 
shows/2012-05-14/risky-bank-investments-and-us-economy (“There is a fundamental problem 
here in that nobody has prosecuted anybody from the subprime meltdown, anybody from the 
MF Global situation. . . . My view is there should’ve been a ton of indictments brought.” 
(quoting Michael Greenberger, a former senior regulator at the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission)).  
 102. Consider, for example, if one person was unwittingly a carrier—but not himself 
infected due to a natural immunity—of a terminal, contagious disease and spread it to several 
others. Significant harm results, yet it would be unreasonable to seek revenge on that person for 
something of which he was unaware.  
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B. Addressing Failures That Result When Parties Follow Outdated 
Heuristic-Based Customs 
To address failures that result when parties follow outdated 
heuristic-based customs, we focus primarily on internalizing 
externalities.103 This focus implicates the theory of civil damages, the 
goal of which is to “put the plaintiff in the same position . . . as he 
would have been had there been no injury or breach”—namely, to 
compensate the plaintiff for actual injuries.104 In so doing, civil 
damages (1) “restore a sense of fairness” and (2) incentivize actors to 
internalize externalities.105 
Externalities could be internalized by imposing civil damages for 
costs “closely associated with” the act that causes the externalities.106 
If such damages were imposed for foreseeable harms, the 
externalities would be at least partly internalized. If such damages 
were imposed for all harms, regardless of foreseeability, most if not 
all externalities would be internalized. 
Civil damages are normally imposed only for foreseeable 
harms.107 However, civil damages can be imposed for all harms, 
regardless of foreseeability, under the allocation-of-resources 
justification of enterprise liability.108 The rationale for enterprise 
liability is that prices should reflect the “actual costs” of goods so as 
to allow purchasers to make informed decisions.109 Therefore, “the 
cost of injuries should be borne by the activities which caused them,” 
regardless of fault, because injuries represent a “real cost” of those 
activities.110 Foreseeability is irrelevant under enterprise liability 
 
 103. Criminal liability also could be used to address those failures, but we have shown in 
Part III.A, supra, why imposing criminal liability would be inappropriate.  
 104. Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking the Theory of 
Damages in a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1053, 1060 (2011) (quoting WALLACE H. 
WHIGAM, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMMERCIAL LAW 82 (1913)).  
 105. Id. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (discussing two justifications for civil liability on the basis of 
internalizing externalities—loss spreading and allocation of resources—in the law-and-
economics literature). 
 106. Calabresi, supra note 105, at 514. 
 107. Id. at 529. 
 108. See id. (explaining by example that the allocation-of-resources justification would 
impose costs regardless of foreseeability). Another justification for enterprise liability is loss 
spreading, such as when the defendant can insure against the damages or pass them on to buyers 
of products or services. Id. 
 109. Id. at 502.  
 110. Id. at 505. 
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because unforeseeable harms are “just as truly costs” of doing 
business as foreseeable harms.111 
1. Applying the Theory of Civil Damages to Natural Persons and 
Firms.  Which justification for liability should apply in the case of 
damages caused by reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs? In 
a financial context, we believe the answer should depend on whether 
the defendant is a natural person or a firm. A natural person, unlike 
an enterprise (such as a firm), usually cannot effectively reallocate 
resources to prevent harm. A natural person can also be expected to 
follow—and, as an individual, likely cannot change—social norms, 
including custom-derived norms. Following these norms should be 
encouraged because it usually reinforces successful self-regulation of 
the financial community of which the individual is a member.112 
Therefore, a natural person who follows custom-derived norms based 
on outdated heuristic-based customs should only be liable for 
foreseeable damages. 
In contrast, financial firms can more effectively reallocate their 
resources to prevent harm. For example, we already have discussed 
how firms could engage in more self-aware operational risk 
management and reporting.113 Imposing liability for following 
outdated custom-derived norms, regardless of foreseeability of harm, 
could be a critical motivator for firms to engage in that risk-
management and reporting effort—effectively pushing firms to try to 
recognize when they are following an outdated norm.114 That effort is 
needed because following outdated custom-derived norms no longer 
would result in “successful” self-regulation.115 Moreover, under the 
allocation-of-resources justification of enterprise-liability theory, even 
unforeseeable harms are a cost of doing business.116 Therefore, we 
believe that a financial firm that follows custom-derived norms based 
 
 111. Id. at 529. 
 112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra Part II.A. 
 114. This Essay does not examine whether there should be a safe harbor from liability for 
firms that take appropriate due-diligence steps in that risk-management and reporting effort. 
Any such safe harbor would have to take into account, for example, how those steps could be 
defined and whether they would be likely to lead to an acceptable cost-benefit balance. 
 115. For a discussion of successful self-regulation that results from following custom-derived 
norms, see supra notes 15, 112 and accompanying text.  
 116. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
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on outdated heuristic-based customs should be liable for all damages, 
whether or not foreseeable. 
For example, a financial firm that uses VaR models to assess risk, 
even after markets have changed to embed credit-default swaps that 
distort the risk assessments,117 should be liable for damages to the 
extent those models underpredict risk and third parties are injured 
because of that under prediction. An underwriter that sells ABS 
CDO securities to investors and discloses the risk on the securities 
based on those VaR models should thus be liable to the investors for 
any losses resulting from the under prediction.118 
We recognize possible counterarguments to such expanded civil 
liability. Expanded liability may seem unfair, for example, because at 
least some firms may be unable to purchase insurance or charge 
higher prices to spread unforeseeable losses.119 Moreover, expanded 
liability would penalize conduct that conformed to prevailing societal 
norms—in our case, a custom-derived norm—at the time it was 
performed.120 Nonetheless, we support expanded civil liability because 
not compensating third parties for arguably preventable losses caused 
by a financial firm’s profit-making activities would be equally if not 
more unfair.121 
 
 117. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 118. The discussion in these paragraphs is a normative analysis and does not take into 
account how positive law, such as whether the underwriter might have a due-diligence duty or 
defense under applicable securities laws, might impact tort liability. Cf. MARC I. STEINBERG, 
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 217–18 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing such a duty and possible 
defense under the federal securities laws in the United States). Also, we contemplate that if 
positive law were to be changed to follow our normative analysis, that change would occur 
legislatively. Because of moral conceptions that tend to influence common-law judges, see, e.g., 
Jeremy Waldron, Do Judges Reason Morally?, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 38–39 
(Grant Huscroft ed., 2008) (finding that “judges seem to take moral issues seriously”), judges 
might be reluctant to extend tort-law liability to internalize externalities of actions not deemed 
to be morally wrongful, cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
20 (1993) (observing that the law does not require all externalities to be internalized).  
 119. Calabresi, supra note 105, at 529.  
 120. We assume that the conduct was neither in bad faith nor, at the time performed, in 
violation of a then-existing law. Also, we are not concerned with the easier case of when law 
need only address parties who all operate within the given custom. For instance, contracts 
between merchants to which the Uniform Commercial Code applies are interpreted to implicitly 
adopt a “usage of trade”—a type of custom-derived norm. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2012); Elizabeth 
Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 
U. PITT. L. REV. 515, 515 n.3 (1981). In that case, however, only the parties to the contract are 
affected by the custom-derived norm, while the custom-to-failure cycle addressed in our Essay 
may result in harm to third parties. 
 121. But cf. TREBILCOCK, supra note 118, at 20 (asking what types of externalities should be 
internalized). Imposing liability on banks, which are members of the financial community, for 
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2. Ex Post Facto Considerations.  The foregoing analysis has not 
necessarily taken into account when the law creating the civil liability 
arises. That uncertainty calls into question whether civil liability, 
especially for unforeseeable harm, should be able to be imposed ex 
post facto—that is, by law that arises, whether by statute or common 
law, after a party follows an outdated heuristic-based custom. 
Imposing ex post facto civil liability on firms that follow outdated 
heuristic-derived customs should not, on balance, be unfair because, 
under the allocation-of-resources theory of enterprise liability,122 
harms caused by reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs are as 
much costs of doing business as more foreseeable injuries. Imposing 
ex post facto civil liability on natural persons who follow outdated 
heuristic-derived customs likewise should not be unfair. If, as this 
Essay argues, natural persons would only be liable for foreseeable 
harm, they should have been aware of the consequences of following 
those customs. That point assumes, of course, that foreseeability is 
not—as it should not be—assessed using hindsight bias. 
From a constitutional standpoint, imposing ex post facto civil 
liability should also be acceptable. Unlike criminal liability, ex post 
facto civil liability is not unconstitutional.123 Furthermore, courts 
routinely impose ex post facto civil liability. For example, in applying 
tort law’s “reasonably prudent person” standard of care in negligence 
actions,124 a jury “determines what the expected level of conduct in 
 
following outdated custom-derived norms also might be inconsistent, to some extent, with cases 
holding that banks owe no duty to third parties with whom they are not in privity. See, e.g., City 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 764 A.2d 411, 417 (N.J. 2001) (“Absent a 
special relationship, courts will typically bar claims of non-customers against banks.”). But cf. 
Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1369–71 (Ala. 1996) (holding that banks have a 
duty for foreseeable harms to third parties and stating, in dicta, that “the nature of the activity 
of a bank . . . is such that some duty to the public in the exercise of the bank’s business may be 
justifiably imposed”). However, any such inconsistency could easily be resolved by imposing a 
statutory duty. 
 122. For the observation that not compensating third parties for arguably preventable losses 
caused by a financial firm’s profit-making activities would be equally if not more unfair, see 
supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.  
 123. Although the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not expressly limited to 
laws imposing criminal liability, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, the Supreme Court has held 
that it applies only to criminal laws, Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912); see 
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 497 (4th ed. 
2011) (citing cases in which the Ex Post Facto Clause did not invalidate civil legislation).  
 124. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS 47 (4th ed. 2010). As a positive matter, the reasonably prudent person standard would 
presumably be applied to members of the financial community in cases of negligence with 
respect to third parties. The professional standard of care applies in cases involving contracts for 
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the community should be.”125 Because jury instructions provide little 
guidance on the proper determination of this standard of care, jurors 
“must draw on their own understanding of reasonable behavior, 
based on their experience of the world.”126 In that endeavor, they may 
call upon their “personal knowledge” of and “community 
acceptance” of any existing practice and need not confine themselves 
to the actual actions of community members.127 Because the jury is 
effectively defining the community norm at the trial stage and not 
necessarily at the time of the alleged tort,128 civil liability is sometimes 
 
services with a client (that is, in cases of privity). See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 
438 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971) (“In the practice of his profession, a public accountant may be 
held liable for damages to his client resulting from either fraud or negligence.”). Note, however, 
that at least one court has held that liability may extend in professional malpractice cases to 
third-party victims for reasonably foreseeable intentional misrepresentation. Rusch Factors, Inc. 
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968). 
 125. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 49; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & 
DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 170 (11th ed. 2005). In 
professional tort-negligence cases—those involving “specialized skill and training”—the 
standard of care is that of the ordinary, competent member of that profession under similar 
circumstances. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 93. Note that the standard is “ordinary,” 
rather than “average,” since “average” would, by definition, mean that half the professionals 
could not meet the standard. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra, at 170. Because this standard of care 
expressly references the practices of the community, then-existing community custom is clearly 
implicated: “The defendant’s deviation from custom establishes breach of duty, while the 
defendant’s compliance with the custom of the profession insulates the defendant from 
negligence liability.” DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 94. For example, the standard of care 
for accountants and auditors is “to exercise that degree of care, skill, and competence exercised 
by reasonably competent members of the profession,” considering “generally accepted 
accounting principles” and “generally accepted auditing standards.” WARREN FREEDMAN, 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN THE BUSINESS PROFESSIONS: A SURVEY GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 
AND CLIENTS 19 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 
91 GEO. L.J. 633, 654 (2003). For pattern jury instructions, see, for example, JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
OF CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 401 (2012); NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CIVIL 2:16 (3d ed. 2011); and 2 PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 13.20 (4th ed. 2010).  
 127. Hetcher, supra note 126, at 654. Jurors may consider existing customs of the 
community, but such customs are “not conclusive” and therefore not binding upon the jury. 3 
FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON 
TORTS § 17.3, at 653–54 (3d ed. 2007). For communities dealing in complex products requiring 
specialized knowledge—such as the financial community—jurors may also lack the requisite 
knowledge to consider and assess the customs of those communities. Application of a 
professional standard of care in which reasonableness is judged according to the actions of an 
ordinary community member would avoid such difficulties. John E. Montgomery, Cognitive 
Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal To Limit Their Effects Without Changing 
the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15, 41 (2006).  
 128. See Hetcher, supra note 126, at 634 (“The jury has a great deal of normative discretion 
in deciding what is reasonably prudent conduct.” (quoting Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in 
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imposed based on ex post norms.129 Indeed, courts and commentators 
have explicitly acknowledged that evidence of compliance with norms 
in existence at the time of the alleged tort does not “conclusively 
establish” lack of breach of duty.130 
CONCLUSION 
In areas of complexity, our limited ability to process information 
often requires us to simplify reality in order to make decisions. 
Modern finance, for example, has become so complex that the 
financial community routinely relies on these types of simplifications, 
or heuristics. Thus, the financial community routinely determines the 
creditworthiness of securities by relying on formalistic credit ratings 
and assesses the risk associated with financial products by relying on 
simplified mathematical models. Without this reliance, financial 
markets could not operate. 
 
Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424–25 
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 129. Judge Learned Hand noted just this possibility, writing: “It is true that we think of [the 
duty to act as a reasonably prudent person] as though it were imposed before the event, because 
it demands only ‘reasonable’ care; but that does not specify the conduct required and creates a 
duty incapable of being known in advance, and it is ascertained and imposed only retroactively.” 
Stornelli v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 F.2d 461, 462–63 (1943) (dicta). Judge Hand, therefore, 
subscribed to a formulaic consideration of costs and benefits. United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947) (describing his B < PL analysis). The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
(2010) endorses adoption of a balancing of factors akin to a “risk-benefit test” similar to Judge 
Hand’s approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (2010). However, despite the Restatement’s position, many jury 
instructions do not currently instruct the jury to engage in this balancing to determine whether 
there was a breach. See, e.g., supra note 127 and sources cited therein. 
 130. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 69. It seems incongruous, however, that deviation 
from an industry standard sufficiently establishes a breach of duty, while conformity with a 
standard cannot sufficiently establish a lack of such breach of duty; the industry standard either 
reflects best practices of the industry or it does not. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 68.  
  Product-liability law adopts a similar position with respect to industry standards. David 
G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 
1019–20 (2004); Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1455 (2009). But see Vetri, supra, at 1454 (noting that some cases suggest 
that deviation from industry standards is “persuasive proof of design defect” because such 
standards “carry[] the approval of a significant segment of an industry” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Frazier v. Cont’l Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The disproportionate impact afforded deviation from an industry standard relative to 
conformity with an industry standard seems incongruous: the industry standard either reflects 
best practices of the industry or it does not.  
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When reliance on heuristics becomes routine and widespread 
within a community, it can develop into a custom. Society benefits as 
long as such a “heuristic-based custom” reasonably approximates 
reality. In the financial sector, however, rapid changes in markets and 
products have disconnected some of these customs from reality, 
leading to massive failures. Increasing financial complexity is also 
accelerating the rate of change, threatening future failures. This Essay 
examines this “custom-to-failure cycle,” analyzing how law can help 
to manage the cycle and mitigate its failures. The Essay argues that 
law should require financial firms to engage in more self-aware risk 
management and reporting in order to reevaluate their heuristic-
based customs periodically. The Essay also engages the fundamental 
but more difficult question of whether law should impose liability for 
unforeseeable harm caused by conduct that conformed to prevailing 
societal norms—in our case, a custom-derived norm for which the 
underlying heuristic has become outdated—at the time performed. It 
explains why civil liability should be appropriate to help deter 
reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs and to internalize the 
harm that can occur when parties follow those outdated customs. It 
also shows why financial firms should be liable for all associated 
harm, whereas natural persons should be liable only for foreseeable 
harm. 
 
